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Towards a world free of nuclear weapons: benchmarks and timeframes  
Hiromichi Umebayashi (Former RECNA Director)  
It is now nearly three years since RECNA was established in April 
2012. These three years in effect coincided with the new review 
cycle towards the 2015 NPT Review Conference. During the first 
year of RECNA’s establishment the First Session of the Preparatory 
Committee took place, and RECNA has subsequently monitored the 
direction taken in this cycle by each participating state.  
 
Following the end of the Cold War the first boom in which the key-
word of “a world free of nuclear weapons” was focused upon was 
around the time of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. 
It was in that year that Professor Joseph Rotblat and the Pugwash 
Conferences won the Nobel Peace Prize. During this period there 
were a number of critical occurrences such as the issuance by the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) of its Advisory Opinion on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, and here I would 
like to consider the debate about the road map towards ‘a world 
free of nuclear weapons’ as it continues to be relevant up until the 
present day. 
 
When one attempts to realize a grand project that cannot be easily 
achieved through ordinary means, the first step is to draw up a road 
map or itinerary. The key concepts that emerge at this point are the 
benchmarks that are the intermediate targets and the time line or 
timeframe. 
 
In August 1996, two vital road maps were suggested. The first was 
the report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nucle-
ar Weapons organized by the government of Australia, and the sec-
ond was the Programme of Action for the Elimination of Nuclear 
Weapons proposed by 28 nonaligned nations participating at the 
Conference on Disarmament. Both of these demanded common 
benchmarks such as a ban on nuclear testing, a ban on the produc-
tion of fissile material for weapons use, further arms reductions by 
the U.S. and Russia, the establishment of a verification system and a 
nuclear weapons convention; however, there was one important 
difference between the two. This was that while the 28 nonaligned 
nations specified a target date of achieving “a world free of nuclear 
weapons” by the year 2020, after cautious consideration the Can-
berra Commission decided not to specify a timeframe. Although no 
reason for this is stated, considering the fact that the commission’s 
composition included experts from nuclear weapon states there can 
be no doubt that it was thought that suggesting a meaningful 
timeframe was simply not feasible. They probably thought that stat-
ing a date was little more than building castles in the air.  
 
Two years later in 1998, the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), a middle 
power nation group playing a leading role in nuclear disarmament 
was established. I have paid close attention to the movements of this 
international coalition ever since its advent. My understanding is 
that the NAC too is cautious about any discussions involving specific 
timeframes. The statement issued by the NAC upon its establish-
ment in 1998 stated that in order to maintain a world free of nuclear 
weapons, “a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally binding 
instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing set 
of instruments ” was necessary, and thus they specified benchmarks 
equivalent to a 
Nuclear Weapons 
Convention. How-
ever, they did not 
go as far as men-
tioning a timeframe 
for it. 
 
The NAC changed 
as a result of the 
2010 NPT Review 
Conference. At the 
2012 Preparatory 
Committee it ar-
gued that “a legally-
binding framework 
for the total elimi-




and timelines, backed 
by a strong system of 
verification, in order to be efficient and credible.”   In other words, 
the NAC considered it necessary for discussions on timelines to be 
included in the new NPT review cycle. At the 2010 Review Confer-
ence, all the member nations agreed to “make special efforts to es-
tablish the necessary framework to achieve and maintain a world 
without nuclear weapons,” so NAC’s policy change was perfectly 
natural. 
 
However, the NAC had set the agenda for the 2015 Review Confer-
ence from a standpoint one step back from this assertion of 2012. 
The recommendation that the NAC proposed in 2014 was that there 
should be a forum at the Review Conference where state parties 
would “explore ... options for elaboration of the effective measures” 
for nuclear disarmament.  Probably because the NAC thought, when 
considering the series of meetings such as the Vienna Conference on 
the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons and the 2013 Open-
ended Working Group (OEWG), it was still too early to start men-
tioning the issue of timeframes. This is typified by the manner in 
which the nuclear weapon states and states like Japan that are de-
pendent on nuclear arms have made no effort whatsoever to move 
on from the “step-by-step approach.”  
 
The step-by-step approach may appear to be one in which interme-
diate targets are raised and then cleared one by one, but this inter-
pretation is erroneous at its very roots. Unlike the recommenda-
tions of the Canberra Commission, the step-by-step approach makes 
no attempt to create a road map, let alone a timeframe. The step-by-
step approach does not make any attempt to draw up an overall 
image of how we can compose “a world free of nuclear weapons.” In 
order for Japan, the only nation in the world to suffer war-time 
atomic bombings, to overcome its passivity, there is a need for hard 
thinking at every level including at RECNA. (March, 2015) 
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The Third Interna-
tional Conference on 
the Humanitarian 
Impact of Nuclear 
Weapons was host-
ed by the Austrian 
government on De-
cember 8 and 9, 
2014. The confer-
ence in Vienna fol-
lows on from the 
first conference held 
in Oslo, Norway, in 
March 2013 and the 
second conference held in Nayarit, Mexico, in February 2014. Coun-
tries participating in the third conference numbered 158, exceeding 
that of both the first and second conferences. Of the five nuclear-
weapon states, the United States and the United Kingdom participat-
ed for the first time. Of the other states thought to possess nuclear 
weapons, India and Pakistan chose to participate while Israel and 
North Korea were absent. The large number of participants also 
included representatives from the International Committee of the 
Red Cross and various organizations of the United Nations, as well as 
from NGOs and academia. At the conference venue of Hofburg Pal-
ace, a heated atmosphere filled the palace’s grand hall, which was 
packed full with participants. Those unable to get a seat in the grand 
hall were able to view the proceedings on a monitor set up in a sepa-
rate room. 
 
Austria’s Strategic Approach 
Recent focus on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons has led 
to a strengthening of international opinion in favor of the prohibi-
tion of nuclear weapons by law, a most logical conclusion. In Mexico, 
the Chair of the Nayarit Conference stated “The broad-based and 
comprehensive discussions on the humanitarian impact of nuclear 
weapons should lead to the commitment of States and civil society to 
reach new international standards and norms, through a legally 
binding instrument .” The Chair also declared that “it is time to take 
action,” and called for the initiation of a diplomatic process condu-
cive to this goal. While these constructive statements by the Chair of 
the Nayarit Conference were welcomed by many states and mem-
bers of civil society who shared the same sentiments, other states 
with a dislike for legal discussions were made even more wary.  
 
In this context, the approach taken by Austria was consistently cau-
tious and strategic. It was repeatedly stated that the conference was 
not an occasion for diplomatic negotiations. As conference host the 
Austrian government sent out a call for a wide range of participants, 
including those states possessing nuclear weapons, while also put-
ting together an ambitious program that included areas not previ-
ously addressed. During the four sessions, the main points discussed 
at the previous two conferences such as the impact of nuclear weap-
ons explosions and nuclear weapons testing, as well as the risks of 
deliberate or accidental nuclear weapon detonations were covered, 
and further evidence was presented regarding response capabilities 
in the case of use of nuclear weapons. In addition, something which 
had not been mentioned previously, the issue of risks inherent with 
nuclear deterrence measures was taken up. Furthermore, discus-
sions were held anew on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weap-
ons and international norms in light of existing international laws 
such as international environment law and international health law. 
Keeping in mind that the NPT Review Conference had been sched-
uled to be held four months after the Vienna conference, it could be 
said that the discussions of legal matters in Vienna were aimed at 
contributing to the debate about the abolition of nuclear weapons 
legally, while also trying to avoid causing any further divisions in the 
international community. Austria’s strategic approach, which shows 
consideration for the differing standpoints of various states, is also 
manifested in the two documents – “Chair's Summary” and “Austrian 
Pledge,” which are mentioned further down. 
 
Proposals to Overcome Opposing Standpoints 
In the General Debate, which followed on from the sessions, delega-
tions from more than one hundred governmental and international 
organizations came together with participants from civil society to 
take the floor. Many calls, mainly from non-aligned nations, were 
made for negotiations towards a treaty to abolish nuclear weapons. 
However, nuclear-weapon states, such as the United States and the 
United Kingdom, and a number of so-called under the nuclear um-
brella states emphasized the effectiveness of a step-by-step ap-
proach or building-block approach. The latter made a string of com-
ments reflecting the current tendency of apprehension such as that 
there was no short-cut [to nuclear disarmament], that consideration 
should be given to security as well as the humanitarian aspect, and 
that strategic stability would be destroyed.  
In addition, statements by various countries included many concrete 
proposals to overcome the long-standing structural opposition. One 
of those proposals came from the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), com-
posed of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and South Afri-
ca, which calls for a review of the options for “effective measures” as 
sought in Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons  at the next Review Conference. NAC presented some op-
tions for legal frameworks such as a Nuclear Weapons Convention (a 
multilateral treaty to outlaw nuclear weapons) in a working docu-
ment submitted to the third meeting of the 2014 NPT Review Con-
ference Preparatory Committee. NAC also had a resolution adopted 
by the United Nations General Assembly in autumn 2014 which urg-
es States parties to the treaty to explore, during the 2015 Review 
Conference, options for the elaboration of the effective measures 
envisaged in and required by article VI of the treaty . Other pro-
posals included Sweden’s call for an Open Ended Working Group 
under the United Nations General Assembly  to discuss options to 
achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world and a call by Cuba and others 
to utilize the United Nations High-Level Conference on Nuclear Dis-




Following on from the “Chair’s Summary,” the Austrian government 
representative read out the “Austrian Pledge,” a document which 
could be said to be quite unprecedented. Austria indicated its inten-
tions that through the Vienna Conference, it had come to inescapable 
conclusions and therefore would make the Pledge to take them for-
ward with interested parties in available fora, including in the con-
text of the NPT and its upcoming 2015 Review Conference . 
The most noteworthy point of the Pledge is Austria’s request to all 
states parties to the NPT “to identify and pursue effective measures 
to fill the legal gap for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear 
weapons.” In regard to exploring options for the elaboration of the 
effective measures required by article VI of the treaty during the 
2015 Review Conference, this follows the same line as the NAC pro-
posal and was expected to bring about progress in discussions with 
those countries who insisted that it was still too premature for such 
treaty negotiations.  
 
A scene from the Conference,  
December 8 2014  
Attending the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons  
 Keiko Nakamura (Associate Professor RECNA) 
On November 5, 2014, 
Dr. Gregory Kulacki of 
the Union of Con-
cerned Scientists (UCS; 
a U.S.-based NGO) and 
an expert on China’s 
nuclear issues, gave a 
lecture during his visit 
to Nagasaki at the 
RECNA Research Sem-
inar titled, “China’s 
Nuclear Strategy: Dia-
log with the US and the 
Role of Japan,” which 
was followed by an 
exchange of views. Dr. Kulacki, who has lived in China for more than 
20 years, is the premiere US expert on China and has many acquaint-
ances and friends in China. Although his knowledge, sourced from his 
network of information and personal connections, is recognized to be 
extremely reliable, Dr. Kulacki’s views have also been criticized as 
being biased in favor of China. However, his activities in the UCS have 
undeniably been very beneficial for nuclear policy experts, not only 
in the U.S. and China, but around the world for understanding Chi-
nese nuclear policy. 
 
In his lecture, Dr. Kulacki detailed several misunderstandings by the 
U.S. regarding China’s policy of nuclear modernization. The current 
belief that has spread in the U.S. regarding China’s policy is that the 
nation has recently begun shifting to a broader strategy than their 
traditional posture of minimum deterrence and pledge of no first use. 
He thoroughly explained that this understanding was based on incor-
rect translations of Chinese texts and on unreliable information 
sources. Specific examples that were given are the 1995 paper by 
Alastair Johnston  published in International Security and the paper 
by Michael Chase, Andrew Erickson, and Christopher Yeaw  pub-
lished in the Journal of Strategic Studies in 2009. The point made was 
that because these studies were based on Chinese military reports 
that are not publicly available and were not publications intended for 
external release, the accuracy of the translations cannot be con-
firmed. Dr. Kulacki states that, according to the most authoritative 
military reports released in 2003 and 2007, China’s long-standing 
posture of minimum deterrence and pledge of no first use remain 
unchanged. 
 
Another example is the January 2011 news item that China had shift-
ed its no-first-use policy. Dr. Kulacki indicated his negative views on 
this issue since there were obvious errors due to misunderstandings 
and mistranslations of information in all the research papers (the 
source of information for the news), making them unreliable. He 
criticized the current situation of research in the United States on 
China’s nuclear arms policy stating that it is impossible to reach any 
reliable conclusion from analyses based on such dubious sources of 
information. 
 
Dr. Kulacki also stated that overcoming the language barrier was 
critical in understanding the strategies of other nations, and that it 
was extremely risky to decide policy based on mistranslations and 
inaccurate interpretations. He also emphasized the importance of 
having a reliable information source inside the target nation, since 
the reliability of an information source cannot often be determined 
from outside that nation. 
 
On the other hand, the reason for such problems lies in the utter lack 
of policy transparency in China. Improving their transparency would 
be meaningful also for the Chinese, stated Dr. Kulacki, adding that 
China too must endeavor to become more open. Although a U.S.-
China strategic dialog is taking place even at the military level, he 
mentioned the fundamental reticence of China to provide any useful 
information, a backdrop that leads to misunderstandings and errors 
of the types previously mentioned. 
 
Finally, Dr. Kulacki talked about a movement in the United States in 
which he is currently involved. That is de-alerting, or changing the 
launch-ready status of nuclear weapons. He said that Japan’s role in 
regard to this is extremely important. The statement issued by the 
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative Ministerial Meeting in 
Hiroshima in April 2014 , clearly proposes de-alerting, thus showing 
how this point is recognized and valued. De-alerting nuclear weap-
ons lowers the risk of a nuclear conflict and also leads to diminishing 
the role of nuclear weapons. Dr. Kulacki asserted that as an ally of a 
nuclear-weapon state, if Japan would raise its voice to promote de-
alerting, this would have a major impact. 
  
Handing Down the Atomic Bombing Experience – Continuing to Speak about the Tragedy 
Chie Shijo  (RECNA Visiting Researcher)  
When I ask acquaintances and families of atomic bomb survivors I 
have not seen for a while about news of them I am increasingly told 
“Unfortunately….” They have died, or even though they live they are 
unable to talk…. I have also learned of the passing away of someone 
who was very kind to me by seeing his or her obituary in the news-
paper. I poignantly feel the ageing of the atomic bomb survivors. 
Now, while we can still directly hear the experiences of those who 
lived through the war is the last opportunity we will have to observe 
and examine their tales and the accompanying problem of handing 
down those tales face to face with them.  
 
The atomic bomb survivors have been retelling their experiences for 
many a long year. One form of this retelling is giving testimony. The 
dictionary defines “testimony” as “Proving a certain fact using words. 
Speaking the truth as a witness, or those words.” The word was origi-
nally used in legal settings, but it has become used for describing 
wartime experiences. The subject of testimony varies widely from 
the written to the spoken word, and includes the “atomic bombing 
experience lectures”* that the survivors address directly to the pub-
lic. In 2013, the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum was visited by 
643,000 people, of which 173,000 (mainly students on school trips) 
listened to the atomic bombing experience lectures of survivors affil-
iated to the Nagasaki Foundation for the Promotion of Peace. Similar 
lectures are systematically conducted in Hiroshima by the Hiroshima 
Peace Memorial Museum and several other organizations. Hitherto 
many people have come into direct contact with the tales of the 
atomic bombing survivors through school trips and peace studies. 
The atomic bombing experience lectures conducted as a part of 
school education have become the main forum for handing down the 
telling of survivor's experiences, probably surpassing even that of 
asking immediate family members about their experiences.  
 
Without a doubt the atomic bombing experience lectures have pro-
vided a precious opportunity for a great many people who have no 
wartime experience to listen directly to the tales of the survivors. 
However, while these lectures have indeed provided a valuable 
chance for many to listen to those involved in the calamitous events, 
this system in which a single person addresses many people within a 
limited space of time in a lecture format and enables them to careful-
ly listen to their important experiences, has also led to a uniform and 
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 RECNA Research Seminar: Dr. Gregory Kulacki of the UCS 
Tastujiro Suzuki (RECNA Director) 
Dr.Kulacki at the Lecture, November 5 2014  
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conventionalized way of speaking. The survivors who wrench their 
hearts trying to explain their experiences in an easily understood 
manner suffer mentally from the worry that their words “are not 
reaching people's hearts.” Taking the rostrum and telling hundreds 
of members of the public about your personal experiences is not like 
chatting about the war with family or friends; it is a highly special-
ized way of talking about wartime experiences. It is not possible for 
students to discuss things with each other during lectures, as this is a 
part of school tuition. If someone hears a word they are not sure of it 
is far from easy to interrupt the lecture and ask questions. It is hard 
for the individual to take one’s time and listen to the survivor's tales 
within a limited timeframe. Within the hushed auditorium the expe-
riences of the survivors have to be listened to with sober attention. 
 
In the course of pursuing the research theme of the damage caused 
by the atomic bombings I have personally had the chance to listen to 
the tales of many survivors. Nearly all of these stories are bleak, sad 
tales — the lack of sufficient food during the war, the state when the 
atomic bomb was dropped, how their beloved family members 
passed away, and with what sorts of scars they have had to live out 
their lives with. Nonetheless, amid all this tragedy there lies a pano-
rama of the past about which they talk positively with a sense of fun 
or nostalgia. “You probably won’t know this but there used to be this 
building here…,” “The kids used to play in the river here all the 
time...,” “It was a bit naughty, but I used to sneak into the cinema and 
watch a film…” and so on. Sometimes when I’m listening to the ac-
count of a survivor who relates their experiences with a gentle ex-
pression on their face a vista of old Nagasaki before the bombing 
seems to appear before my eyes. This was the true pleasure of listen-
ing to survivors’ experiences, and at the same time my way of learn-
ing about the damage of the bombing.   
 
I wonder if there is a way that a forum can be created outside of the 
atomic bombing experience lectures system in which speakers and 
listeners can talk with ease to each other and beyond generational 
gaps. I hope that I will be able to help by playing a part in creating a 
new place where atomic bombing experiences can continue to be 
related at RECNA, which is the very place that can assemble support-
ers to think about nuclear issues, and in Nagasaki, the very site of the 
atomic bombing.  
 
* Also known as “survivor testimonies,” “peace studies,” and “school 
excursion lectures.”  
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